Tort Cases. [This page is updated by Dr Peter Jepson.]
Anns v Merton Borough Council (1977)
Caparo v Dickman (1990) (Must read)
Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority (1998)
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] - tort law - (Must read)
Law Society v KPMG Peat Warwick and others (1999).
Rondel v Worsley (1969) - (Must read)
Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co (1977)
Hall v Simons (2000) - barristers immunity
W and others v Essex County Council (1998)
X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (1995).
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] the founding case of tort law.
Claimant had gone to a cafe with a friend, who had bought her a drink of ginger beer. She had poured some of the drink into a glass and consumed it. When she poured the rest she found the decomposing remains of a dead snail.
Claimant became unwell and brought a claim of tort negligence against the manufacturer.
Because this was a unique case it was decided to first establish if it was legally possible for the manufacturer to be liable in law. This meant that the House of Lords considered only the issue of legal liability (the H of L referred the issue of factual liability back to the court, in which the case was started, so they can determine the facts within the case - e.g. was there a snail within the bottle and whether the manufacturer was negligent etc).
However, the House of Lords did decide that the manufacturer could be liable in certain circumstances. In deciding the legal principles, Lord Atkin commented:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour: and the lawyers question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
For a summary of Lord Atkins comments see: Donogue v Stevenson
In this case a motorcyclist was killed in a road accident for which he was responsible. A pregnant woman, who had got off a tram at scene of the accident (having heard the noise of an accident) claimed that when she reached the scene of the accident she saw blood on the road and as a result suffered shock which put her into premature labour - resulting in the loss of the baby. She subsequently brought a claim in relation to nervous shock and the resulting loss/damage.
House of Lords held that there was insufficient proximity between the motorcyclist and the claimant. There was not a duty of care, she was not present at the scene of the accident (she had arrived after the accident had occurred).
[The Courts require a very close degree of proximity in these type of nervous shock or psychiatric harm cases]
X and others v Bedfordshire County Council (1995).
In this case the House of Lords held that a local authority owes no duty of care in negligence to children in respect of its statutory obligations towards them.
Lord Browne Wilkinson said... "a common law duty of care cannot be imposed on a statutory duty if the observance of such common law duty of care would be inconsistent with, or have a tendency to discourage, the due performance of its statutory duty."
This case determined the formula currently used by the Courts for determining a duty of care. To do so, three things must be evident (i.e. all three) ...
(1) Was the loss to the claimant foreseeable?
(2) Was there sufficient proximity between the parties?
(3) Is it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.
In Caparo v Dickman the loss suffered was economic as a result of a negligent statement. The House of Lords established that while it is foreseeable that investors may use published accounts to make investment decisions, the accountants who produced such accounts would not be liable for losses as a result of the accounts being wrong. This is because there is not sufficient proximity between the accountants and, effectively, anyone at all who may rely upon them.
However, in the case of the Law Society v KPMG Peat Warwick and others Caparo was distinguished, in the Court of Appeal, it was held that the auditors owed a duty of care to the Law Society because they knew the Law Society would rely on the auditors report when they were deciding if the solicitors were complying with the solicitors' accounts rules.
In Anns v Merton Borough Council (1977) the H of L held that where there was foreseeability and proximity there should be a duty of care unless there was a policy reason for holding that no duty existed. However, this came to be regarded as too wide a test and it was turned round in Caparo v Dickman, so that even where there is foreseeability and proximity the court may decide that there should not be a duty of care, because it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose one.
In Clunis v Camden & Islington Health Authority (1998) the C of A held that a mental patient released into the community is not owed a duty of care in negligence by the Health Authority.
In Harris v Evans (1998) the Court of Appeal held that there was no duty of care owed by the Health & Safety Executive to a person affected by the performance of their statutory duty. The claimant in this case had lost money as a result of bad advice from the HSE is setting up his business.
In W and others v Essex County Council (1998) foster parents had told social workers that they would not accept any child who was suspected of being a child abuser. Social Services placed a known child abuser with the family and he abused the foster parents own children. The Court of Appeal held that children of a family into which foster children are placed may be owed a duty of care by the local authority - because the statute governs the relationship between the foster parents and the local authority (not the children of the foster parents). Hence, where statute is not applicable, common law could be applied.
In Rondel v Worsley (1969) the H of L held that a barrister owes no duty of care in negligence to his client. It was said to be contrary to public policy to allow clients to sue barristers because the original case would effectively be re-opened at the subsequent court hearing.
However, in Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co (1977) this immunity was held not to extend to advice - so it is possible to sue a barrister for a negligent written opinion.
In Kelley v Corston (1977) the immunity was extended to cover advice to accept a compromise that was then consented to by a judge.
In Atwell v Michael Perry & Co it was held that advice on whether to appeal was not covered by the immunity, but a failure to run a particular defence was covered.
Despite such, the House of Lords turned all of this on its head when it decided in Hall v Simons (2000) - by 4-3 - that for both barristers and solicitors the immunity from a claim in negligence must end. This applies to both civil and criminal cases, with (obiter dicta) Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett arguing that any claim arising from a criminal case (i.e. a claim that D's solicitor/barrister was negligent and thus resulting in him being found guilty of a criminal offence) should not be able to proceed unless the Appeal Court had first set aside the conviction. Indeed, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Millett argued that any such civil claim should normally be struck out as an abuse of process of the court.