R v Hancock and Shankland (1986)
D was a solider, home on leave. He was staying with his mother and stepfather. The family had a party during which D and his stepfather drank a lot of alcohol. They stayed up after everyone had gone to bed and shortly after 4am a shot was fired and the D was heard to shout ìIíve shot my fatherî.
The court was told that D and his stepfather had held a contest to see who could load his gun and be ready to fire first. D had been quicker and stood pointing the gun at his stepfather. Who teased him that he would not dare to use live bullets. At that point and by Dís own admission, the gun went off.
In evidence he claimed that he never intended or conceived that he would kill or injure his stepfather.
The House of Lords held that nothing
less than a direct intention to kill or cause G.B.H was sufficient mens rea for
murder. Merely foreseeing Vís death as probable was not intent, although it
could be evidence of it. (His conviction for murder was substituted by
manslaughter).
R
v Hancock and Shankland (1986)
The Dís were striking miners who knew that a taxi carrying men breaking the strike would pass under a particular bridge. They waited there and dropped a concrete block, which hit the taxi as it passed underneath, killing the driver. They were convicted of murder and appealed.
The House of Lords held that this had been incorrect and substituted a verdict of manslaughter. They were concerned that the question of whether death was ëa natural consequenceí of the Dís act, might suggest to juries that they need not consider the degree of probability. A 10 million to one chance that death would occur, might still mean that death was a natural consequence ñ BUT this degree of likelihood suggests little evidence of intent.
R v Nedrick (1986) ñ D said only intended to frighten the woman
The D had a grudge against a woman and poured paraffin through the letterbox of her house and set it alight. The womanís child died in the fire. The D was convicted of murder and appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted manslaughter. The court held that the jury should consider how probable the consequence was, and whether it was foreseen by the D. The jury may then infer intention if they are sure that D realised that the consequence was a virtual certainty.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and stated that while the words ëvirtually certainí as in Nedrick were preferable, it was not a misdirection to juries if it was made clear that the decision was theirs.
However, when the case reached the House of Lords their Lordships decided that the judge had confused the jury by his comments about a substantial risk and since it was impossible to know which the of two statements the jury had followed this must be considered a material misdirection.