Stephanie Adams
Introduction
The possible charges against Sushila in each scenario all involve the possibility of the use of intoxication as a defence. The term intoxication includes both excessive drinking and drug taking. Unlike the defences of duress the intoxication defence is not an excuse for the defendant to say they would not have acted as they did but for their intoxication. The defence is instead used as a way of putting doubt into the jurors mind as to whether D formed the necessary mens rea needed for the particular crime. However specific rules have been created to prevent defendants being acquitted just because their intoxication was so extreme they did not foresee the consequences. For the defence to be considered the defendant must offer proof / evidence of intoxication, which will then be considered by the judge as per Groark (1999). In Groark D had apparently consumed ten pints of beer before striking the victim’s face with a knuckle-duster and was charged with wounding with intent to cause GBH. On trial he gave evidence that he was acting in self-defence, and therefore the judge did not direct the jury to intoxication, resulting in the defendant’s conviction. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant’s appeal stating that as the defendant had not raised the defence there was no obligation on the judge to either. This was confirmed in the later case of McKnight (2000).
Availability of the intoxication defence relating to the charge of actual bodily harm
The first scenario regarding Sushila involves the offence of actual bodily harm, which occurred as a result of her hitting a barman over the head with her laptop computer because he wasn’t serving her fast enough and assaulting two police officers who had been summoned to take her away. When looking at the details surrounding the incident it is apparent that the defence of intoxication may be available because before committing the offence as Sushila had taken some amphetamines that day, and drank eight glasses of vodka ‘in quick succession’ at the pub.
When looking at the issue of intoxication as a defence we must first ascertain whether the intoxication was voluntary or involuntary. In this scenario Sushila’s intoxication was voluntary, as she put herself in the intoxicated state and committed the offence of actual bodily harm. Despite the view in DPP v Beard (1920) where it was stated that ‘voluntary drunkenness was never an excuse for criminal misconduct, and…voluntary drunkenness must be considered rather an aggravation than a defence,’ intoxication has been allowed as a defence for serious crimes of specific intent. Unfortunately Sushila has been charged with actual bodily harm which is classifed as a basic intent crime, so as per DPP v Beard (1920) intoxication cannot be used as a defence. This was confirmed in the case of Bratty (1963). Lord Denning stated that ‘If the drunken man is so drunk that he does not know what he is doing, he has a defence to any charge, such as murder or wounding with intent, in which specific intent is essential, but he is still liable to be convicted of manslaughter or unlawful wounding for which specific intent is necessary.’ The House of Lords further reaffirmed the view that intoxication could not be used in crimes of basic intent in the case of DPP v Majewski (1977). In this case D took part in a 36-hour drug and drink marathon. On the Monday evening he got involved in a pub brawl and assaulted a customer, the manager and several police officers. He was charged with three offences of assault occasioning bodily harm. In defence he claimed that he was intoxicated, which prevented him from foreseeing the consequences of his actions. His defence failed and he was convicted of all three offences. Lord Elwyn-Jones LC in this case said that ‘self-induced intoxication, however gross and even if it has produced a condition akin to… automatism, cannot excuse crimes of basic intent such as … assault.’ As a result of these cases Sushila cannot rely on the defence of intoxication as she has been charged with a basic intent crime which is not compatible with the defence. Within the case of Majewski there were certain passages which suggested that the defendant will automatically be guilty of the offence after he has committed the actus reus of a basic intent offence whilst intoxicated. This is because the ‘intoxication substitutes for the mens rea of the offence.’ This approach has been softened slightly, by Richardson and Irwin (1999) which confirms the fact that intoxication is no defence to basic intent offences, but states that the defendant is not automatically guilty just because they have committed the actus reus. In Richardson and Irwin D, E and V were students at Surrey University. D and E were charged with inflicting GBH a basic intent crime after five pints of lager they indulged in horse play which eventually led to V being dropped from the edge of a balcony. The Court of Appeal quashed their convictions, as the judge should have asked what these particular men would have foreseen had they not been drinking. When bearing in mind this ruling it seems unlikely that Sushila would be able to rely on this case as if she had not been drinking she would have foreseen the actions of her consequences unlike the students who were considered hypothetically not to be young men.
In conclusion in this situation Sushila would not be able to rely on the defence of intoxication for the charge of actual bodily harm due to the fact it is a basic intent crime.
Availability of the intoxication defence relating to the charge of murder
In the next scenario Sushila has been charged with murder for the death of the barman. In this scenario the availability of the intoxication defence changes due to the type of crime committed. Although Sushila’s intoxication remains voluntary, the crime is now one of specific intent, therefore she can rely on the defence of intoxication as per DPP v Beard (1920). When the case goes to trial, the prosecution must prove mens rea, the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm and that death or serious injury was a virtual certainty, as per Woollin (1996). It seems unlikely that the crown will be able to prove that Sushila had an intention to kill or that death was a virtual certainty from her actions. However even if they can prove these points Sushila could use the defence of intoxication which if successful would allow her to be found guilty of the lesser crime of manslaughter. This was confirmed in the case of Lipman (1970) where the defendant and victim, both addicted to drugs, took some LSD one night. The next day the victim’s body was found, and medical evidence showed she had died of asphyxia/ suffocation a result of a sheet being crammed into her mouth. On trial D claimed that he had experienced a LSD ‘trip’ where he believed that V was a snake in the centre of the earth attacking him. He claimed that he had no knowledge of the real events and had not intended to hurt the girl. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. They decided that the defendant could not be found guilty of murder, a specific intent crime, if the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, could not be established. They did though believe he could be found guilty of manslaughter as an unlawful act had resulted in the death of the victim. This case highlights how Sushila may be able to gain a lesser sentence of manslaughter as the facts infer that she did not have the intention to kill or cause GBH.
Availability of the intoxication defence relating to the charge of arson
In this scenario Sushila has been charged with arson after she set fire to the office. This is a crime of specific intent which allows the use of the intoxication defence. However when looking at this scenario it is not clear on the facts of the case whether the intoxication was voluntary or involuntary. The facts state that ‘a colleague had given Sushila several Valium pills’, but does not state whether this was with or without Sushila’s knowledge. If Sushila did not realise she had been given the Valium pills she would be able to rely on the defence of involuntary intoxication which has a very different outcome to that of voluntary intoxication.
I will first consider the availability of the offence assuming that Sushila was given the pills without her knowledge. In the case of Pearson (1835) it was stated that ‘if a party be made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is not responsible.’ This idea has been developed over a number of cases and it is now held that if intoxication ‘negatives mens rea, he is entitled to an acquittal, but if not, he remains liable, even though he would not have acted as he did had he remained sober.’ This can be seen through the case of Kingston (1995) where D a known paedophile was lured to a flat along with a fifteen year old boy who had been drugged and was asleep on the bed. The defendant was then invited to abuse the boy and for blackmail purposes was photographed and tape-recorded. He claimed that he could not remember anything about the night in question and that his coffee had been drugged, and without this intoxication he would have controlled himself and his tendencies. He was convicted after the jury were told to convict as long as they were sure that despite the effect of any drugs, he had still formed the mens rea of indecent assault. This was later quashed in the Court of Appeal who felt the defence of involuntary intoxication should be open to him. However the House of Lords changed this and restored the conviction as once the intent to commit the crime is proved, intoxication is no defence. In relation to Sushila’s case it would be difficult to prove the intent for arson except the fact she was upset she was passed over for promotion. If her intoxication was involuntary I think she would be able to use the defence of intoxication.
However the successfulness of her defence if she voluntarily took the Valium pills would change considerably and depend upon the circumstances in which she accepted the pills from her colleague. It would be no defence for Sushila to claim that she did not know exactly what affect the intoxicating substance, the Valium pills would have on her. This can be seen from the case of Allen (1988) where D was given some home-made wine, which he did not realise had a high alcohol content. As a result be became extremely drunk and carried out a serious sexual assault. He was convicted and this was upheld by the Court of Appeal as there was no evidence that his drinking was not voluntary. Alternatively if Sushila accepted the Valium pills without realising the risk that instead of calming her down they may actually induce ‘aggressive, unpredictable conduct’ she may be able to rely upon the defence. This was seen in Hardie (1985), a similar case to Sushila’s. In this case D’s long-term relationship had broken down and he was asked to leave the flat he shared with his girlfriend. He became very upset and during the day took several Valium tablets after being reassured they were ‘old stock’ which would do him no harm. He later fell asleep and started a fire in a bedroom wardrobe. He was convicted of arson but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. The statement made by Parker LJ called Valium ‘wholly different in kind from drugs which are liable to cause unpredictability or aggressiveness’ and stated the taking of such drugs even if excessive ‘cannot in the ordinary way raise a conclusive presumption against the admission of intoxication’. Therefore if Sushila took the Valium pills without knowing the risk, and her colleague had reassured her they would do no harm, based on Hardie it seems as if she could rely on the defence. However if the jury thinks she did know the risk of taking the drugs, and she went ahead with the risk anyway they may find her reckless.
Therefore the availability of the intoxication defence relating to the offence of arson is not clear due to the hazy facts of the case.
Conclusion
In conclusion Sushila’s cases show that there are limited circumstances where intoxication the intoxication defence can be used and even when the defence is successful it may not lead to a full acquittal but a charge of a lesser offence.