The MíNaghten Rules produce so many anomalies, they are in need of urgent reform.

Written by Lisa Lee - A2 Student

The MíNaghten Rules are used when it comes to deciding the issue of insanity. If the evidence complies with these rules and the defendant is considered insane, then S.2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act provides that a special verdict of ënot guilty by reason of insanityí is recorded.  

The MíNaghten Rules emerged from the case of MíNaghten 1843, where the defendant attempted to kill the then Prime Minister but, instead, shot and killed the PMís secretary. MíNaghten was found not guilty by reason of insanity, however, this caused such an outcry that the House of Lords formed these so-called MíNaghten Rules providing the circumstances in which a person can be considered to be insane; the defendant must first prove that he was suffering from a defect of reason, then they must prove that that defect was caused by a disease of the mind. The last point provides that the defendant must prove that he did not know what he was doing, or, if he did, that he did not know that this act was wrong.

However in the application of these rules, anomalies have arisen, causing confusion and outcry in some areas. A major problem is that the rules seem outdated as they were formed in 1843 and, obviously, there have been a great many changes in the law and in the medical profession.

An example of the problems arising from the application of these rules is shown in the case of Clarke 1972. This case illustrates the problems with defining a ëdefect of reasoní. The defendant was charged with theft; her defence rested on her forgetfulness which, she claimed, was brought on by her depression. The trial judge decided to raise the issue of insanity and as a result (and probably due to the defendantís resistance of the stigma attached to insanity) the defendant changed her plea to guilty. However, she then appealed against her conviction. The Court of Appeal the decided that her behaviour ëfell very far short of showing that she suffered from a defect of reasoní. They then decided that the rules are not meant to apply to those who retain the full power of reason but ëin moments of confusion or absent-mindednessí fail to use those powers to the full. Therefore, the conviction was quashed due to the misdirection.

Similarly, there has been difficulty in defining a ëdisease of the mindí.  It is the judge that decides as to what constitutes a disease of the mind. This has led to some criticisms, as cited by Diana Roe, that there is a ëpurely legalí formula for establishing insanity and this formula does not conform to medical views.

However, the position on this matter was made clear in Kemp 1957. Here, the Court of Appeal stated that the law,

ëis not concerned with the brain but with the mind, in the sense that ëmindí is ordinarily used, the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding.í

In this case, the defendant inflicted GBH upon his wife for no apparent reason, evidence had also been brought to show that he was normally a devoted husband. He claimed he lost consciousness due to his suffering of arteriosclerosis, which had caused a congestion of blood in his brain. The prosecution had tried to argue that the defect of reason was caused by a physical illness and not a mental one, therefore it did not come under the definition within the MíNaghten Rules. Lord Devlin did not agree with this and upheld the judgeís finding of insanity.

In the case of Sullivan 1984, the House of Lords addressed the issue of what constitutes a disease of the mind with regard to epilepsy. When the defendant had kicked and injured an elderly man whilst suffering an attack of psychomotor epilepsy, he was charged with GBH. The subsequent medical evidence showed that the attack happened whilst the defendant was in the third stage of his epileptic fit; this meant that he would have been unaware as to what he was doing. The judge decided to direct the jury on the issue of insanity. The defendant changed his plea to guilty of ABH and was found guilty; however, he later appealed against the judgeís direction. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal, approving the statements made in Kemp. Their Lordships decided that it did not matter whether the impairment was organic, functional or permanent as long as it existed at the time of the crime.

Although the decision in this case is in line with the law, it seems somewhat harsh to brand someone suffering with a condition such as epilepsy ëinsaneí. Perhaps another defence for those suffering from such conditions should be created and the defence of insanity left to the truly insane, those suffering with diseases purely of the mind.  

Because of these reasons, Diana Roe puts forward the criticism that these rules are disliked by the people they were designed to protect. The cases of Clarke and Sullivan show how the defendants would rather plead guilty to an offence rather than be branded ëinsaneí. 

Diabetes is also a condition that can manifest itself to be classed as a disease of the mind. From diabetes, arise two different conditions, hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia. The difference between the both has caused much confusion and disagreement in the legal system, mainly as to what constitutes as an outside source. 

The case of Hennessy 1989 deals with hyperglycaemia. This condition arises when the diabetic FAILS to take a dose of insulin; such an act can result in the person becoming aggressive and disorientated and could, possibly, lead to death (the same occurs with hypoglycaemia).  In this case, the accused was charged with taking away a conveyance and driving whilst disqualified. He argued that he had failed to take his insulin because he was suffering from anxiety, stress and depression which affected his blood sugar level. He, therefore, argued that this state of hyperglycaemia led to a state of automatism, thereby allowing this defence. The judge decided to raise the issue of insanity as the hyperglycaemia had arisen from the diabetes itself, not an outside source. However, Hennessy did not want to have the stigma of being branded insane and changed his plea to guilty and then appealed against the judgeís finding.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Lord Lane went on to state that anxiety, stress and depression ëconstitute a state of mind which is prone to recurí and could not be classed as outside factors, thus, the defence of automatism was not available to the defendant.  

Hypoglycaemia, however, occurs when the sufferer takes TOO MUCH insulin. The courts take the view that this condition is caused by outside sources and, therefore does not come under the MíNaghten Rules. This is illustrated in the case of Quick 1973. The defendant was a nurse in a mental hospital and was charged with occasioning ABH to a severely disabled patient. Due to his condition at the time of the offence, the defendant tried to argue that the defence of automatism should be available to him. However, the trial judge put forward the defence of insanity. Therefore, Quick changed his plea to guilty and appealed. The Court of Appeal decided that his mental condition was not caused by his diabetes but his use of insulin and alcohol and which were outside sources. The appeal was then allowed because it was felt the defence of automatism should have been put before the jury.  

The comments made by Lawton L J in this case show how the judges are uneasy about the development of the law in this area. He stated that ë common sense is affronted by the prospect of a diabetic being sent to such a hospital when in most cases the disordered mental condition can be rectified quickly by pushing a lump of sugarÖinto the patientís mouthí. Thus, it is felt that too much sugar in the patientís blood can be rectified as easily.  

These rules are also criticised for being too restricted. This is because it doesnít cover the patient who is subject to an irresistible impulse that he cannot control, which is clearly insanity.  

These rules have also been subject to criticism from important bodies such as the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, the Butler Commission and the Law Commission, thus, reform has been suggested. 

The Draft Criminal Code, with recommendations from the Butler Committee has put forward a plan for reform. They suggest that the verdict should be changed to ënot guilty by reason of mental insanityí, this seems less offensive than insanity. Clause 35 provides that this would be established if it was proved that the defendant was suffering from a severe mental illness/handicap and 2 medical practitioners provided this evidence.

Clause 36 then goes on to state that this verdict should be brought in where the defendant acts in a state of automatism due to this mental disorder or a combination of mental disorder and intoxication.  

The recommendations also suggest that this should be brought in where fault cannot be established for this reason or where, due to the mental disorder, the defendant believes an exempting circumstance existed.  

Therefore, it seems that, whilst many legal rules produce problematic circumstances, it seems that MíNaghten Rules, perhaps due to their age, produce too many anomalies and, therefore, could benefit from reform.

 Lisa Lee, March 2003